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S everal years ago, we published an essay in which we claimed that qualitative re-search can be productively thought 
of as existing along a continuum. Ai-tistic 
interpretivists anchor one end, whereas sci-
entific positivists hold down the other. In be-
tween is a vast and varied middle ground 
wherein most qualitative researchers locate 
themselves (Ellis & Ellingson, 2000). We 
constructed a nuanced range of possibilities 
to describe what many others have socially 
constructed as dichotomies (mutually exclu-
sive, paired opposites), such as art- science, 
hard-soft, and qualitative-quantitative (see 
Potter, 1995). Dichotomous thinking re-
mains the default mode of the academy. 
"Language, and thus meaning, depends on a 
system of differences," explains Gergen 
(1994, p. 9). "These differences have been 
cast in terms of binaries ... . All are distin-
guished by virtue of what they are not." No-
where is this evidenced more strongly than 
in the quantitative-qualitative divide. Even 
in qualitative work itself polarities m ark the 
differences between interpretivists and real-
ists (Atkinson, Coffey, Delamont, Lofland, & 
Lofland, 2001; Bochner & Ellis, 1999). Re-
cently autoethnographers have begun to dis-
tinguish themselves from one another by 
separating evocative from analytic autoeth-
nography. Analytic autoethnographers fo-
cus on developing theoretical explanations 
of broader social phenomena, whereas evo-
cative autoethnographers focus on narrative 
presentations that open up conversations 
and evoke emotional responses (Hunt & 
Junco, 2006). 
When Carolyn invited me (Laura) to coau-
thor this chapter, I accepted with enthusi-
asm, excited to be working with her again. 
445 
446 11> STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 
Perusing the Handbook prospectus, I chuck-
led at the irony of the two of us jointly con-
structing a story about the intersections 
between autoethnography and social con-
structionism once again. Those familiar with 
Carolyn's methodological novel on auto-
ethnography (Ellis, 2004) might recognize 
me as the witty, weak-bladdered woman in 
Carolyn's qualitative methods seminar. 
Whereas Carolyn cheerfully explores my 
bodily weakness to add levity to her story, 
her discussion of my dissertation only hints 
at the lengthy, intense saga of my negotia-
tion with her and my committee over the 
role autoethnography would play in my 
ethnographic construction of an interdisci-
plinary geriatric oncology team. Thankfully, 
the story had a happy ending; together we 
resisted the art-science dichotomy and em-
braced crystallization, a postmodern form of 
methodological tJ.iangulation that utilizes 
multiple methods of analysis and multiple 
genres of representation (Richardson, 
2000). I combined narrative ethnography, 
grounded theory analysis, autoethnography, 
and feminist analyses into a single disser-
tation prqject, now revised into a book 
(Ellingson, 2005a). In this chapter, Carolyn 
and I continue that conversation, develop-
ing our conception of autoethnography as a 
constructionist project. 
When I (Carolyn) asked Laura to coau-
thor this chapter with me, I hesitated at first 
as I thought about how insistent she had 
been in her dissertation on including every-
thing but "the kitchen sink." She wanted to 
engage in crystallization and approach the 
oncology team she studied from a variety of 
perspectives. Her goal was to illuminate the 
socially constructed world of the team while 
simultaneously revealing the constructed na-
ture of her multiple accounts of the team. 
Yes, perhaps I would have preferred at the 
time that Laura do it "my" way. Don't we all 
want to reproduce ourselves? But I also 
pride myself on helping students to find 
their particular and unique voices, especially 
if they are different from mine. I was leery of 
Laura's proposed project because I've dis-
covered in my many years of directing 
dissertations that the main roadblock for 
students is that they try to do too much. 
Then they encounter difficulty doing any 
one thing deeply or thoroughly enough. 
Laura was among the very best students I 
had ever mentored, and I wanted her to suc-
ceed. Laura persevered, and I guess I 
shouldn't have been surprised, given that 
she was as astute at traditional analysis as she 
was talented as a narrative writer, that she 
pulled off an excellent dissertation that in-
corporated multiple perspectives and meth-
ods. In light of our experience, I thought she 
would be the perfect coauthor for this chap-
ter. 
In this chapter, we explore autoethnog-
raphy as a social constructionist project. We 
want to resist the tendency to dichotomize 
and instead explore how autoethnography 
makes connections between seemingly polar 
opposites. Though we see it as a sign of prog-
ress that authors desire to tease out differ-
ences in autoethnographic projects, we ar-
gue that concentrating on dichotomies is 
counterproductive, given that autoethnog-
raphy by definition operates as a bridge, 
connecting autobiography and ethnography 
in order to study the intersection of self and 
others, self and culture. 
After further detailing in this chapter the 
limits of dichotomous thinking, we sketch 
the meanings and goals of autoethnography. 
We then discuss social constructionist con-
cepts pertinent to autoethnography by de-
constructing various methodological dichot-
omies. 
The Limits 
of Dichotomous Thinking 
I (Laura) often feel! am channeling Carolyn 
when I introduce the continuum of qualita-
tive methods to my undergraduate qualita-
tive students, so tied to our personal rela-
tionship is my knowledge of and passion for 
qualitative methods. I recall with fondness 
Carolyn's chart of qualitative research with 
the squiggly, broken line down the middle 
between the art and science sides. "Qualita-
tive as art and qualitative as science," she 
giys adamantly, "are endpoints of a contin-
lium. You have to decide where you want to 
ibcate yourselves in terms of your identity 
ind in every research project you do. That 
location will determine your goals, the pro-
tedures you use, and the claims you make" 
(Ellis, 2004, pp. 25-31 , 359-363). 
\ I address the limits of dichotomous think-
irig early in my qualitative methods course, 
tight after introducing social construction-
ism as the epistemology that underlies the 
iliethodological continuum. "The central 
~remise of social constructionism," I tell stu-
dents, "is that meaning is not inherent. The 
i::entral concerns of constructionist inquiry 
ire to study what people 'know' and how 
they create, apply, contest, and act upon 
these ideas" (Harris, 2006, p. 225). 
Ci My undergraduate students sit with their 
~esks arranged in a circle, faces not yet 
drooping with late-term fatigue but more 
than a few evidencing the mild resentment 
$om of taking required courses. I discuss 
fhe politics of the field of qualitative re-
iearch and how hotly contested many issues 
~-e within the field, referencing their read-
frig of James Potter (1995). My students look 
at me with naked disbelief when I add with a 
~iriile, "And some of us actually care so 
(li:eply and passionately about this stuff that 
W,e have ongoing debates and dialogues and 
fven get mad at each other sometimes!" The 
ftudents shake their heads, mystified as to 
li_ow anyone could care so much about such 
~h:opic. 
'fhThen I tell them that making sense of the 
World through dichotomous thinking is un-
ptoductive. "Dichotomies are pervasive in 
M[estern thinking," I add, warming to my 
J9pic, my excitement growing. The circle of 
}fudents remains quite unexcited, but I con-
tinue. 
'''Knowledge is not 'out there' waitmg to 
be found. Instead, we socially construct 
knowledge in relationships, through for-
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mal channels, such as academic journals, 
and through informal, interpersonal 
interaction with others [ Gergen, 1994]. 
Unfortunately, we are so schooled in 
some ways of thinking that we no longer 
notice how limiting those mental patterns 
can be. There ai·e three ways in which di-
chotomies limit our thinking. You'll want 
to take notes on this and ask me questions 
if you don't understand, since this isn't in 
the reading, and it will be on the exam." 
This last comment brings them to rapt at-
tention, and they poise their pens above 
their notebooks as I explain. 
"First, dichotomies present as opposites 
what are actually interdependent. Socially 
constructed opposites actually depend 
upon each other for existence; without 
women there would be no men, only peo-
ple; without hard, there would be no soft, 
only a single texture. 
"Second, dichotomies limit the possibil-
ities to two and only two, negating t11e 
near-infinite possibilities present between 
any two poles. Thus we can resist the limi-
tations of femininity and masculinity as 
mutually exclusive opposites and imagine 
them instead as poles between which 
there are many degrees of androgyny, 
blended identities, and possible perfor-
mances of sex, gender, and sexuality. 
"Finally, when we limit possibilities to 
only two, one will inevitably be valued 
over the other. It is not possible to view 
the world in terms of equal opposites; one 
side is always already privileged." 
As I finish the $tatement I notice I am lean-
ing forward, gesturing enthusiastically, my 
voice effortlessly projecting throughout the 
room. One of my students, a lovely young 
woman who works in my department office, 
looks up at my impassioned soliloquy and 
gives me an amused smile. 
As my students dutifully scribble away, I 
think back to my own courses in ,qualitative 
methods with Carolyn, narrative inquiry and 
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social constructionism courses with Art 
Bochner, and feminist theory and methods 
courses in women's studies, all of which chal-
lenged me to think beyond, through, and 
around accepted (dichotomous) norms for 
research and knowledge construction in aca-
deme. The fundamental axiom that culture 
and meaning are socially constructed under-
girded my graduate coursework, opening up 
for me bountiful possibilities for challenging 
the taken-for-grantedness of everyday life. I 
try to offer my students the same. 
I recall that Carolyn constructed qualita-
tive methods not only as a continuum but as 
a passionate pursuit. "I love method, as you 
know," she reaffirmed in a recent e-mail. "I 
like to figure out the process of how to know. 
I am passionate about making methods 
dovetail with life as lived, rather than with 
rigid procedures." I couldn't have agreed 
more, and her enthusiasm reinfected me im-
mediately. Though I don't have as much suc-
cess teaching undergraduates to love quali-
tative methods in a 10-week quarter as 
Carolyn does teaching committed graduate 
students in her interpretive studies pro-
gram, many of my students report that they 
find it at least palatable. I try to be content 
with that. 
Both of us teach the entire continuum but 
locate ourselves between the middle and ar-
tistic ends. Carolyn more comfortably inhab-
its the near regions of the artistic pole than 
Laura does, and Laura indulges more often 
in systematic, middle-ground analyses than 
Carolyn does ( e.g., Ellingson, 2002, in press-
b; Ellis, 1995, 2002c). But Carolyn has done 
grounded analysis in the past (Ellis, 1986) 
and sometimes now grounds her narratives 
in theory and other voices (Ellis, 1998, 2000, 
2002b ), and Laura writes artistic narra-
tives and often includes long portions of 
narrative in her grounded analysis pieces 
(Ellingson, 2003, 2005a). 
Both of us write from a social construc-
tionist perspective, which provides the epis-
temological 1..mderpinniJ.1gs for autoethnog-
raphy and other boundary-spanning 
qualitative methods we embrace (Gubrium 
& Holstein, 1997). Social constructionism, 
we believe, is an approach particularly adept 
at challenging fundamental dichotomies, 
not only those in society in general but also 
those that structure traditional approaches 
to research, such as: 
~ Self-other 
o Subject- object 
., Humanities-social science 
e Process-product 
• Personal-political 
o Emotional- rational 
C!) Passionately involved- neutral 
C!) Evocative-analytic 
We view autoethnography as a social con-
structionist approach that enables critical 
reflection on taken-for-granted aspects of so-
ciety, groups, relationships, and the self. 
Autoethnography becomes a space in which 
an individual's passion can bridge individual 
and collective experience to enable richness 
of representation, complexity of under-
standing, and inspiration for activism. 
Defining Autoethnography 
Autoethnography is research, writing, story, 
and method that connect the autobiographi-
cal and personal to the cultural, social, and 
political (Ellis, 2004, p. xix). It is the study of 
a culture of which one is a part, integrated 
with one's relational and inward experi-
ences. The author incorporates the "I'' into 
research and writing, yet analyzes self as if 
studying an "other" (Ellis, 2004; Goodall, 
2000). Autoethnography displays multiple 
layers of consciousness, connecting the 
personal to the cultural. Autoethnographic 
texts appear in a valiety of forms-short sto-
iies, poetry, fiction, novels, photographices-
says, personal essays, journals, fragmented 
and layered writing, and social science 
prose. In these texts, the workings of the self 
are expressed emotionally, physically, and 
cognitively. These texts feature concrete 
action, emotion, embodiment, spirituality, 
and introspection, which appear as relation-
al and institutional stories influenced by his-
tory, social structure, and culture, which 
themselves are revealed dialectically 
through action, feeling, thought, and lan-
guage. Autoethnography portrays meaning 
through dialogue, scenes, characterization, 
and plot, claiming the conventions of lit-
erary writing (Ellis, 2004, p. xix; Ellis & 
Bochner, 2000). 
Similar to many terms used by social scien-
tists, the meanings and applications of auto-
ethnography have evolved in a manner that 
makes precise definition difficult. We in-
clude under the broad rubric of autoeth-
nography those studies that have been re-
ferred to by other similarly situated terms, 
such as: personal narratives (Personal Narra-
tives Group, 1989), narratives of the self(Rich-
ardson, 1994), personal experience narratives 
(Denzin, 1989), personal essays (Krieger, 
1991), ethnographic short stories (Ellis, 1995), 
writing stories (Richardson, 1997), self-
ethnography (Van Maanen, 1995), emotional-
ism (Gub1ium & Holstein, 1997), radical em-
piricism (Jackson, 1989), and many others 
(see Ellis & Bochner, 2000, pp. 739-740). 
Autoethnography is a blurred genre. 
Whether we call a work an autoethnography 
or an ethnography depends as much on the 
claims made by authors as anything else 
(Ellis & Bochner, 2000). We desire to be in-
clusive rather than exclusive, to focus on 
(commonalities among terms and projects 
rather than differences. Autoethnography 
as a genre frees us to move beyond tra-
ditional methods of writing (Gergen & 
:Gergen, 2002), promoting narrative and po-
:etic forms, displays of artifacts, photo-
graphs, drawings, and live performances 
((Ellis, 2004). The predominant form consists 
F6f short stories written by researchers who 
systematically introspect and record their 
'. experience with the intent of evoking emo-
\tional response from readers. Thus auto-
'§ thnographers connect the imaginative style 
~f literature with the rigor of social science 
.ethnography. 
.... Autoethnographers vary in their empha-
fsis on the writing and research process 
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(graphy), culture (ethnos), and self (auto) 
(Reed-Dana.hay, 1997, p. 2). Different exem-
plars of autoethnography fall at different 
places along the continuum of each of these 
three axes. For example, Laurel Richardson 
sees herself as a writer and focuses on 
graphy, often writing about writing (Richard-
son, 2000; Richardson & Lockridge, 2004). 
Carolyn often focuses on the self, and Laura 
often focuses on culture. In all these cases, 
however, the authors include all three di-
mensions in their works, and how much of 
each is included differs in the various pro-
jects they do. 
Although some types of autoethno-
graphic writing focus on the voice and point 
of view of the primary author (Jago, 2006; 
Kiesinger, 2002; Secklin, 2001; Spry, 1997), 
the genre also includes multivoiced narra-
tives in which authors weave their stories 
with those of other participants (Boylorn, 
2006; Drew, 2001; Ellingson, 2005a; Holman 
Jones, 1998) and coauthors (Ellis, Kiesinger, 
& Tillmann-Healy, 1997). Coconstructed 
narratives, interactive interviews, and inter-
active focus groups are variations of this in-
teractive approach (Davis & Ellis, in press; 
Ellis & Bochner, 2000; Ellis et al., 1997). 
These techniques allow autoethnographers 
to more fully understand the lived experi-
ences and relationship practices that occur 
in interaction with others and in groups and 
systems, as well as the multiple interpreta-
tions, experiences, and voices that emerge in 
lives and stories. 
Autoethnography as a Social 
Constructionist Project 
The practice of autoethnography presumes 
that reality is socially constructed and that 
meaning is constructed through symbolic 
(language) interaction (Berger & Luck-
mann, 1966). Presuming that reality is so-
cially constructed enables autoethnogra-
phers to counter accepted claims about "the 
way things are" or "the way things always 
have been." As described earlier, autoeth-
nography is a broad and wonderfully ambig-
450 o STRATEGIES AND TECHNIQUES 
uous category that encompasses a wide array 
of practices. As authors, we remain ever cog-
nizant of how we participate in the social 
construction of the field of autoethnog-
raphy by participating in this discourse that 
is both autoethnographic and about auto-
ethnography. 
On the one hand, we have much in com-
mon: Laura seeks multigenre crystallization 
in her work (Ellingson, 2005a), and Carolyn 
advocates that "analysis and story also can 
work together" (Ellis, 1993; Ellis & Bochner, 
2006, p. 444). Laura learned about auto-
ethnography from Carolyn, who mentored 
her throughout her PhD program and be-
yond, thus significantly influencing Laura's 
understanding of herself as an ethnogra-
pher and autoethnographer. On the other 
hand, our goals as researchers and authors 
often diverge. Carolyn publishes primarily 
personal autoethnographic narratives ( e .g., 
Ellis, 1995), coconstructed nan-atives (e.g., 
Ellis & Bochner, 1992), and methodological 
commentaries for those who appreciate and 
work at the intersection of social sciences 
and humanities (e.g., Ellis et al ., 1997), thus 
troubling the distinction between humani-
ties and social sciences. Laura offers system-
atic qualitative analyses to more conven-
tional social science audiences in health 
communication and family communication 
(Ellingson, 2002, 2003, in press-a; Ellingson 
& Sotirin, 2006), alongside her narrative and 
autoethnographic writing (Ellingson, 1998; 
2005b ), gleefully troubling the distinctions 
within genres of social science (Ellingson, 
2005a). 
Socially constructed categories such as 
autoethnography do not exist in a vacuum. 
Social institutions, laws and regulations, me-
dia, advocates representing various posi-
tions, and more make up the matrix in 
which ideas are created, maintained, and 
changed over time (Hacking, 1999). In no 
context is this more apparent than in uni-
versities and research institutions. Social 
constructionists posit that the conventional 
standards of scientific inquiry developed 
during the Enlightenment- to remain dis-
passionate, control the conditions, convert 
observations to numerals, search for the an-
swer, and separate truth from practice-are 
rhetorically constructed to privilege the 
powerful elite and marginalize other voices 
(Gergen, 1999, pp. 91- 93). Although not 
suggesting that such research is without 
value, Gergen counters its claims to a privi-
leged status in the process of knowledge pro-
duction. 
Autoethnography developed in large part 
as a response to the alienating effects on 
both researchers and audiences of imper-
sonal, passionless, abstract claims of truth 
generated by such research practices and 
clothed in exclusionary scientific discourse 
(Ellis, 2004). It attempts to disrupt and 
breach taken-for-granted norms of scientific 
discourse by emphasizing lived experience, 
intimate details, subjectivity, and personal 
perspectives. Thus autoethnography as a: 
method participates in the ongoing social 
construction of research norms and prac-
tices at the same time that it seeks to in.flu-. 
ence the social construction of specific phe~ 
nomena ( e.g., child abuse; Hacking, 1999). 
Troubling Dichotomies 
and Socially Constructing 
Alternative Research Modes 
We now turn to a discussion of dichotomies 
that pervade research and explore how 
autoethnography troubles these divisions; 
often providing alternative modes of experi-
encing the process of research. We invite 
readers to think through and beyond po-
larities such as researcher-researched, o~ectivity~ 
subjectivity, process- product, self- others, 
art-science, and personal- political. 
Researcher-Researched 
The researcher-researched dichotomy is un-
done, or at least unraveled, by autoeth-
nographies in which the author becomes a 
participant and the author's experiences, 
emotions, and meanings become data for 
exploration. To a greater or lesser extent, re-
searchers incorporate their personal experi-
ences and standpoints in their research by 
starting with a story about themselves, ex-
plaining their personal connection to the 
project, or by using personal knowledge to 
help them in the research process ( e.g., 
Holman Jones, 1998; Linden, 1992). Femi-
nism contributed significantly to legitimiz-
ing the autobiographical voice associated 
with reflexive ethnography (e.g., Behar, 
1996; Personal Narratives Group, 1989; 
Richardson, 1997). 
Qualitative methodologists refer to the 
process of researching the self as introspec-
tion (Ellis, 1991b). Introspection involves 
the researcher in generating diaries, jour-
nals, freewriting, field notes, and narratives 
of his or her lived experiences, thoughts, 
and feelings, and then using these as data. 
"Resurrecting introspection (conscious 
awareness of awareness or self-examination) 
as a systematical sociological technique will 
allow social constructionists to examine 
emotion as a product of the individual pro-
cessing of meaning as well as socially shared 
cognitions" (Ellis, 1991b, p. 23). I (Carolyn) 
used this technique to construct the experi-
ence of grief for my family, my neighbors, 
and myself in my story of my brother's sud-
den death: 
Even with the planning, we did not anticipate 
the effect seeing the flag-draped casket would 
have on my mother on Sunday night when our 
family went to the funeral home to receive 
friends . Silently, we walk through the bitter 
cold weather and into the funeral home. When 
my mother sees the casket, she screams, "My 
baby. Oh my baby is dead." She collapses to the 
floor, while the rest of us stand rooted to our 
spots. It is like a play rehearsal, and my mother 
has messed up her lines. In slow motion, we fi-
nally help her up and support her still sobbing 
to a chair. My once-powerful and imposing fa-
ther looks helplessly on, confused, as someone 
approaches to remove his coat. 
Several hundred people have come to pay 
respects. [My brother] Art and I shake hands 
or hug each one, thank them for their expres-
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sions of sorrow, exchange light talk, smile, 
sometimes even laugh. "It is God's will. " "God 
will look after him," they say to make us and 
themselves feel better. I nod. The same sen-
tences are uttered over and over. It doesn't 
matter. There are no points for originality. 
(Ellis, 1993, pp. 720-721) 
Using my own experiences, reflections 
and memories, I reconstructed myself and 
people emotionally close to me and to the 
tragic event I describe as a story told within 
the context of my ongoing relationships 
with family and friends . By looking inward 
for data, I, the researcher, became both the 
subject and obj ect of research. 
I (Laura) also turned an analytic lens on 
myself, but as part of a larger ethnographic 
project. I engaged in sensemaking about my-
self and my participants in my fieldwork in 
an interdisciplinary geriatric oncology pro-
gram at a regional cancer center {Ellingson, 
1998). I wrote a layered piece that was essen-
tially an account of how I constructed an un-
derstanding of my relationship to the pa-
tients, their loved ones, and the staff, to 
whom I was a researcher and cancer survi-
vor. Unlike Carolyn, I constructed accounts 
of patients I met only briefly and staff I knew 
but who were not part of my intimate circle. 
In order to explore connections among my 
own previous experiences as a cancer pa-
tient and my understanding of the people in 
the clinic in which I was conducting an eth-
nography, I both wrote narratives based on 
memories and reconstructed events based 
on accounts in my personal journals written 
at the time of my diagnosis and treatment 
for bone cancer: that is, "the process 
of opening inward [ allowed) me to reach 
outward toward understanding" others 
(Berger, 2001, p. 515). 
The following excerpt tells of spending 
Christmas in the hospital in Vermont while 
suffering from septicemia, a serious illness 
brought on by infection and the compromis-
ing of my immune system due to chemother-
apy. After going out for lunch with my 
brother and father, I cry in my hospital bed: 
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Dad and Mark leave early to beat the storm 
home, and, with a lump in my throat, I watch 
them go. They take my presents with them, 
since I have no use for them in the hospital. 
How can the-y leave? Why didn't Mom come? When 
will this end? I think bitterly to myself that they 
all care, but then they get to go home. It is not 
their bodies pierced with needles. Too weak to 
make it to the toilet on crutches, having to use 
a bedpan. Schedule determined by blood 
counts and temperature. Leg aching, stomach 
queasy, buttocks numb from sitting in the bed 
day after day. Alone I lay flat on my back and 
stare at the ceiling all evening. My constant, si-
lent tears creep slowly from the outer corners 
of my eyes and drip into my ears. (Ellingson, 
1998, p. 506) 
The inspiration for this story was a line in my 
journal, written at the lowest point of my 
spirits during treatment, in which I had writ-
ten, "I discovered that when I cry while lay-
ing flat on my back, my tears drip into my 
ears." I analyzed my own experiences and 
joined them with my analysis of field notes 
of my participants. Through autoethnog-
raphy, I demonstrated that the taken-for-
granted demarcation between staff and 
patient is slippery, for all bodies bespeak vul-
nerability. 
Objectivity-Subjectivity 
Being labeled subjective or biased, as it is often 
called, commits the worst of the deadly sins 
within the positivists' worldview. Scientists 
socially constructed the rules of science 
centuries ago, and these rules remain en-
trenched in academic discourse and in 
Western societies in general. Supporters 
construct and present objectivity and subjec-
tivity as a dichotomy with clear points of de-
marcation, and they prize objectivity and dis-
miss or even ridicule subjectivity. From a 
social constructionist perspective, objectiv-
ity is not fundamental or inherent in science 
but "is primarily a linguistic achievement 
that draws on the machine metaphor of hu-
man functioning" (Gergen, 1994, p. 165). 
Claiming objectivity does not make it so but 
rather signifies the power and authority of a 
person or group to assert their particular 
perspective over that of other persons or 
groups. Because power and knowledge intri-
cately intertwine, the authority to judge and 
label some knowledge as objective-and thus 
valuable-ensures that the powerful remain 
so, as knowledge disputing the status quo 
power relations is always already delegit-
imated (see Foucault, 1975). 
Autoethnography interferes with this di-
chotomy by drawing blurry lines between 
detached, external knowledge and personal, 
internal knowledge. Much of the rhetorical 
force of this dichotomy lies in the invocation 
of objective accounts as rational and of sub-
jective ones as emotional. In actual practice, 
however, reading emotions of self and other 
often forms a necessary precursor for ratio-
nal action (Ellis, 1991a). Autoethnographers 
weave their own emotions into their re-
search accounts and "plunge directly into 
the subjective fray, at times becoming pas-
sionately engrossed" (Gubrium & Holstein, 
1997, p. 59). 
For example, I (Laura) not only admit but 
celebrate my subjectivity. I wrote in an ac-
count of the geriatric oncology clinic: 
While many confessional tales have as their 
goal the reassurance of the reader that their 
findings are "uncontaminated" and hence "sci-
entific" and "valid" (Van Maanen, 1988), I have 
as my goal the opposite: to reassure the reader 
that my findings are thoroughly contaminated. 
This contamination with my own lived experi-
ence results in a rich, complex understanding 
of the staff and patients of the clinic in which I 
am observing (and of my own cancer experi-
ence) . . .. For the first time, I now enter the on-
cology context with no immediate implications 
for my own health or that of a loved one. Yet, I 
do not study the patients and staff of the clinic 
with detachment; my own experiences as a pa-
tient filter what I see, hear, and feel. (Ellingson, 
1998, p. 494) 
In reclaiming contamination, I move be-
yond confessing my subjectivity to reveling 
in the possibilities of subjectivity for under-
standing a complex topic. 
I (Carolyn) also eschew the objectivity-
subjectivity dichotomy. In addition to advo-
eating for the impossibility of detachment in 
research (Ellis, 2004), I demonstrate the im-
portance of subjective understanding by al-
lowing some narratives to stand on their 
own without any analysis, explanation, or 
contextualization within a field of research. 
For example, in a narrative about my 
mother's hospitalization, I tell of lovingly 
caring for her: 
Taking care of her feels natural, as though she 
is my child. The love and concern flowing be-
tween us feels like my mom and I are falling in 
love. The emotionality continues during the 
four days and nights I stay with her in the hos-
pital. My life is devoted temporarily to her well-
being. She knows it and is grateful. I am grate-
ful for the experience. I do not mind that she is 
dependent on me. I am engrossed by our feel-
ing, by the seemingly mundane but, for the 
moment, only questions that matter. Are you 
dizzy? In pain? Comfortable? Do you want to 
be pulled up in bed? (Ellis, 1996, p. 242) 
This embodied tale provides concrete de-
tails of caring for an elderly parent. I do not 
attempt to establish distance from the expe-
rience. My sensemaking is visceral and in the 
moment. I tell the tale as I understand it so 
that others can experience the particularity 
of my experience through my story. My 
choice to publish an openly personal (read: 
subjective) story without the scaffolding of 
detachment that frames most qualitative 
work, including much autoethnography-
theories, reviews of literature, methodologi-
cal details-radically refuses to reify the 
opposition of objectivity and subjectivity. In 
so doing, I celebrate the individual's view as 
sufficient for making meaning, and I partici-
pate in troubling the taken-for-grantedness 
of the objectivity-subjectivity dichotomy in 
research. 
Process- Product 
Autoethnography encompasses both 
process-what one does-and product- what 
one gets after it is done. Autoethnography 
reflexively celebrates and often explicitly in-
tegrates processes into the product (Ellis, 
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2004). Revealing and interrogating the 
processes of research is critical to autoeth-
nography and counters the historical im-
perative to obscure the details of the con-
struction of research findings using 
sanitizing strategies such as passive voice 
( e.g., the data were collected; it was found that) 
(Gergen, 1994; Richardson, 2000). In the 
field, during solitary introspection, and/ or 
while participating in interactive reflection 
with others, autoethnographers engage in 
embodied action, not just report on distant 
processes (Ellingson, 2006). Often this takes 
the form of revealing the researcher's com-
plex role in a study of a specific context and 
of acknowledging the messiness and mis-
takes that inevitably imbue the process of 
conducting such research. 
Ethnographers-Laura included- tend to 
want to publish the most credible and per-
suasive version of our stories when we seek 
to influence policy, practice, and/ or theory 
(Ellingson, in press-a). Hence we often sani-
tize our accounts, omitting missteps as irrel-
evant, tangential, or overly personal; histor-
ically, such confessional tales were kept 
separate from authoritative accounts of re-
search (Tedlock, 1991; Van Maanen, 1988). 
Granted, we take a risk when we combine 
confessions of embarrassing moments with 
passionate calls for social, political, and pro-
fessional change based on our findings; 
many will dismiss out of hand work that ad-
mits to a messy process (see Ellingson, 
2005a, in press-a). However, when we pre-
tend that research progresses smoothly, we 
provide inaccurate and deceptively simplis-
tic maps for those who read our work. In ad-
dition to field work, the writing of accounts 
of our work also reflects an embodied, 
messy process that is inextricably bound to 
the final products of our research. 
For example, here I (Laura) give a glimpse 
of the story of writing my ethnography of 
the geriatric oncology clinic: 
I have had it with my body. I am sick to death of 
laying around my little house recoveiing from 
my knee replacement surgery and trying to 
write with my laptop balanced precariously on 
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my uneven lap ... to write so personally about 
my understanding of the clinic seems impossi-
ble from the primarily prone, pain-filled posi-
tion I grudgingly inhabit these days. Somehow, 
I can engage in systematic and detached writ-
ing, but the combination of my physical pain 
and the psychic wounds that accompany it are 
so fresh, so immediate, that attempting to dig 
into my body memories for insights is like rub-
bing salt into open wounds. Unwelcome mem-
ories of the repeated violations of my body . . . 
surface every time a wave of nausea hits or the 
pain spikes. I have no energy for embodiment 
right now. (Ellingson, 2005a, pp. 77- 78) 
Of course, my example also illustrates a pro-
found resistance to the socially constructed 
mind-body dichotomy that deeply influ-
ences Western cultures. Social construction-
ists do not deny that material bodies exist 
apart from discourse but argue that their 
meanings are inseparable: "bodies are not 
only constrained or damaged but also consti-
tuted by discursive relations, social prac-
tices, and historical processes" (Ziarek, 
2005, p. 88). My body always forms part of 
the process of research, and openly discuss-
ing how that happens troubles the process-
product divide. 
In more personal-focused autoethnog-
raphy, the process of constructing the tale 
may be alluded to or included explicitly. I 
(Carolyn) tell the story of sharing with my 
mother a narrative I had written about our 
relationship (Ellis, 2001). The story chroni-
cles my mother's verbal and nonverbal reac-
tions to hearing the former story I had writ-
ten about taking care of her. Then, in an 
italicized parallel narrative interwoven into 
the story, I reflect upon my own reactions to 
sharing the story with my mother: 
As I read this to her, I notice tears in her eyes. I 
think again of how difficult it is to know what 
to say in these situations. I also think that 
bluntly acknowledging that she may never get 
better might be difficult for both of us. Our re-
lationship, to some extent, is based on joy. I 
come home to make her feel better, and it usu-
ally works. Yes, perhaps feeling better might 
mean accepting the pain and living the best life 
she can in spite of it. Certainly, I don't want her 
to feel like she has to play down the pain or 
pretend to think she will g·et better just to make 
me feel good. Or do I? Do I want a relationship 
based upon reality and truth? Could I stand it? 
... I know there will come a time when she and 
I will have this conversation. But not yet. (Ellis, 
2001, p. 604) 
The account of modifying my story as I 
read it to my mother displays the usually hid-
den processes of adapting to one's audience 
and considering the effects of one's words 
upon those who are characters in my stories. 
Moving beyond merely using active voice 
and owning one's own involvement in 
research processes, I resist the process-
product dichotomy by highlighting the pro-
cesses that led to the product, thus 
destabilizing the product as a fixed interpre-
tation of an event and opening up possibili-
ties for multiple understandings. I try to 
show how research findings, as well as hope 
and truth, are socially constructed in rela-
tionships, and how negotiation might 
change as the research and illness progress. I 
also show what I learned about the product 
from focusing on the process of research. 
Self- Others 
In social constructionist theory, the self ex-
ists only in relation to others. The self is not 
a discrete, individual, fixed entity as pro-
moted in Enlightenment philosophy but 
connected to others for understanding. We 
understand the self "not as an individual's 
personal and private cognitive structure but 
as discourse about the self- the performance 
of languages available in the public sphere 
. . . the self as narrative rendered intelligible 
within ongoing relationships" (Gergen, 
1994, p. 185; see also Holstein & Gubrium, 
2000). Autoethnography points to the self as 
embedded in cultural meanings. Doing 
autoethnography affects the social construc-
tion of the author's self. People make sense 
of their experiences through the stories they 
develop about them (Bruner, 1990). These 
stories are continually altered, never static; 
we can retell them in ways that make them fit 
better the "I" who tells them (see Jago, 
2006). Doing autoethnography affects indi-
viduals who do the work of "re-storying" 
their lives; the autoethnographic story be-
comes part of the life, an element of the on-
going construction of self. At times the story 
stands in for the experience itself and be-
comes what one remembers as the experi-
ence (Ellis, 2004). 
Often autoethnographies feature stories 
of resistance to stigmatizing labels. As Ken-
neth Gergen (2006) suggests, "When one 
commits to the dominant logics, values, and 
sanctioned patterns of action within a 
group, it is often at the expense of hushed 
but valued impulses to the contrary" 
(p. 122). Giving voice to those hushed im-
pulses becomes a political act because lan-
guage is indeterminate and imbued with 
power relations. Autoethnography troubles 
the socially constructed categories by show-
ing how they play out in the world and how 
we incorporate them into our identities-or 
do not. "Ways of classifying human beings 
interact with the human beings who are clas-
sified" (Hacking, 1999, p. 31). Hacking calls 
this an "interactive" kind of classification, as 
those who are classified modify their behav-
iors and beliefs because they are affected by 
the classification label (as opposed to label-
ing an element as iron, which causes no 
change in the element's particles). 
The process can work both ways, as Caro-
lyn demonstrates in her story about the role 
of personal details and analysis in her study 
of minor bodily stigma: 
I doubt that I would have been able to move 
outside the category of minor bodily stigmas 
without first immersing myself in it. Categories 
too often limit us without our being aware of 
their influence; once we are aware, too often 
we assume there is no use in trying to break 
through them. Telling and analyzing my per-
sonal story not only helped generate and make 
visible the category of minor bodily stigma, it 
also provided a way through. The categorical 
story offered a name to my experiences where 
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before there was only dread; the personal story 
connected real people with feelings to the la-
bels, where before there were only tactics of 
concealment and denial. Ibis research helped 
me understand the inextricable connections 
between categorical and personal knowledge. 
(Ellis, 1998, p. 535) 
Often labels become essentialized, taken as 
inherent to a group instead of recognized 
as socially constructed (Ziarek, 2005). Fo-
cusing on individual narratives of self-
categorization troubles the naturalness of 
such categories. 
Collaborative self-making, such as that 
which occurs in interactive interviews and 
focus groups, provides another opportunity 
in autoethnogTaphy to produce meaning 
that is "neither subjective nor objective but 
intersubjective" (Onyx & Small, 2001, p. 775, 
original emphasis). In interactive research, 
participants act in an equal relationship as 
coresearchers with other authors/ research-
ers, share authority, and author their own 
lives in their own voices. The group helps 
each member to construct the self. These ap-
proaches give us a way to include the voice 
and feedback of all participants (Hawes, 
1994; Reed-Danahay, 2001) and to under-
stand how participants "assign meaning to 
their realities," rather than how we as re-
searchers evaluate their realities (Daly, 1992, 
p. 8; see also Davis & Ellis, in press). 
Bringing the idea of interactive interviews 
to traditional focus groups, Carolyn, Cris 
Davis, and associates (Davis, Ellis, Myerson, 
Poole, & Smith-Sullivan, 2006) have devel-
oped a methodological approach called in-
teractive focus groups. More than simply a 
large interactive interview, this method bor-
rows characteristics from traditional focus 
groups and other methods, such as interac-
tive interviewing (Ellis et al., 1997; Holstein 
& Gubrium, 1995), interactive group inter-
views (Patton, 2002), leaderless discussion 
groups (Stewart & Shamdasani, 1990), and 
the therapy practice of reflecting teams ( e.g., 
Andersen, 1987, 1995). In an ongoing pro-
ject on re/ claiming middle age, Carolyn and 
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four other women-all middle-aged ( 45-60 
years old) white professionals-discuss aging 
for women in 2006. These conversations 
take place in interactive focus groups. 
"I think that women like us arc socially con-
structing a different story [from our moth-
ers]," Mary says. "We're not buying the canoni-
cal story about what it's like to be an older 
won1an." 
Carolyn interjects, "What was one of the 
first conversations everyone had when we first 
walked in the door?" 
Kendall laughs. "Oh my age, oh my this, oh 
my allergies. My innards are so, blah, blah 
blah." 
"Right," Carolyn says. She turns to Marilyn. 
''Look what we talk about when we go walking 
every week." 
Marilyn and Carolyn respond together. 
"How are your aches and pains today?" 
"Yeah," Carolyn says, "and it feels a lot like 
the conversations I used to hear my mother 
have." (Davis et al., 2006, p. 10} 
As researchers and participants, we probe 
the prevailing social constructions of 
middle-aged women and debate how such 
constructions reflect and do not reflect our 
lived realities as women. 
The highlighting of process in autoeth-
nography complements the work that the 
product, or representation, does in the 
world-in academia and beyond. "Human 
science inquiry is itself a form of social ac-
tion. Knowledge and application are not 
fundamentally separable" (Gergen, 1994, 
p. 140). Readers take a more active role as 
they are invited into the author's world, as 
feelings are evoked about the events being 
described, and as they are stimulated to use 
what they learn there to reflect on, under-
stand, and cope with their own lives. Auto-
ethnographers write meaningfully and 
evocatively about topics that matter and that 
may make a difference, include sensory and 
emotional experience (Shelton, 1995), and 
write from an ethic of care and concern 
(Denzin, 1997; Richardson, 1997). Carolyn 
invites readers to connect and identify with 
her and even to be inspired by her to write 
their own stories: 
I provide my story as an incentive for you to 
put your own into words, compare your expe-
rience to mine, and find companionship in 
your sorrow (Mairs, 1993}. I speak my story so 
that you feel liberated to speak yours without 
feeling guilty that others suffered more and 
therefore your story is not worth telling, your 
feelings unjustified. I believe we each need to 
find personal and collective meaning in the 
events that have transpired and in the dis-
rupted and chaotic lives left behind. (Ellis, 
2002b, p. 378) 
Autoethnography intentionally blurs the 
lines between self and others, between the 
author's particular experiences and the 
universality of those same experiences. 
Whereas autoethnographies of tragic and 
painful or at least difficult circumstances, 
such as most of Carolyn's and Laura's work, 
emphasize making meaning and forging 
connections, others call to joy and playful-
ness, to making connections with auto-
ethnographers who want to share positive 
experiences as opportunities for others to 
celebrate their own strengths, successes, and 
pleasures (e.g., Drew, 2001; Ellis, 2006; 
Lockford, 2004; Tillmann-Healy, 2001). It 
may be that we feel the connection between 
ourselves and others most readily in the 
wake of pain, fear, and loss, but we also con-
struct our positive meanings in relationship 
to others. 
Art-Science 
In the writing of evocative accounts, auto-
ethnographers blend analysis and narrative, 
troubling the socially constructed chasm be-
tween science and the arts (Ellis, 2004). The 
choice of a genre influences perception of 
the audience regardless of the intended 
meaning of the piece: 
for the constructionist, there is good reason to 
be concerned with the form of writing . . . our 
accounts of the world are not maps of the 
world, but operate performatively, to do things 
with others. [We ask] what kind of world do we 
build together through our forms of inscrip-
tion? (Gergen, 1999, p. 185) 
Autoethnographers seek to build a world, 
largely within the academy but also beyond, 
hi which art and science do not exist as a 
rigid and fixed dichotomy but instead form 
a continuum of practices. Rather than op-
posing traditional social science, most auto-
ethnographers (Carolyn and Laura among 
them) instead choose to engage in produc-
tive play with social science writing and re-
search conventions, shedding light on the 
constructed nature of the art-science di-
chotomy and casting doubt on its inevitabil-
ity or exclusive claims to truth. 
One way to accomplish that goal involves 
framing a narrative in a discussion of re-
search and theory before and/ or after the 
narrative as I (Carolyn) did in writing about 
my brother's death. I followed the story with 
ah analysis of surviving the accidental death 
cif a loved one and a discussion of my desire 
to reposition social scientists and their read-
ers closer to literature. I wrote: 
· This article brings ["after death"] into the 
open, allowing us to converse about and try to 
understand it. As such it accomplishes what 
Rorty (1982) says we should expect from social 
scientists- "to act as interpreters for those with 
whom we are not sure how to talk." ... This is, 
after all, what we "hope for from our poets and 
dramatists and novelists" (Rorty, 1982, p. 202). 
... I seek to reposition readers vis a vis the au-
thors of texts of social science research, evok-
ing feeling and identification as well as cogni-
tive processing. As you read this story, some of 
you may have felt empathy with me, as you 
would in watching a "true-to-life" movie; some 
of you may have been reminded of parallels in 
your own lives, as in reading a good novel. Per-
haps reading my work evoked in you emo-
tional experience that you could then examine, 
or led to recall of other emotional situations in 
which you have participated. Acknowledging a 
potential for optional readings gives readers li-
cense to take part in an experience that can re-
veal to them not only how it was for me ( the au-
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thor), but how it could be or once was for 
them. (Ellis, 1993, pp. 725- 726) 
Laura's social science autoethnographies 
usually contain citations to other academics 
and use an academic, disciplinary vocabu-
lary. Layered accounts (Ronai, 1995) move 
back and forth between academic prose and 
narrative, revealing their constructed nature 
through the juxtaposition of social science 
and narrative ways of knowing. In her ongo-
ing ethnography of an outpatient dialysis 
unit, Laura experiments with layering poetic 
representation of interview transcript ex-
cerpts with academic discussion of the social 
construction of professionalism in health 
care to explore the knowledge construction 
of the dialysis technicians. Medical profes-
sionals whose formal education far exceeds 
that of the technicians largely ignore or 
even scorn these paraprofessionals' exper-
tise. Technicians resemble artisans, with a 
great deal of hands-on, tactile knowledge 
that is vital to caregiving but difficult to 
transmit. 
One poem, entitled 'Joking Around," de-
scribes how the technicians adapt to the 
preferences of the patients they work with 
over long periods of time: 
Yeah, you joke around with him, 'cause I 
remember when he first came 
to this clinic, he was 
well to me he still is, 
a grumpy old man 
It took me a week or so until I figured 
him out. 
Give him a bad time. 
Argue with him 
and it makes him happy. That's him. 
You've got to be I hate to say it 
To him it's not disrespectful, but 
you got to be 
kind of like disrespectful towards him 
and speak to him basically in his own 
language 
in order for him to be happy. 
And he has to complain 
to be happy ha ha 
Oh I love that old man. 
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He's one of those patients that when it's 
time 
for him to go it's gonna hurt. 
And other patients it's "Yes ma'am, No 
ma'am" 
'cause that's the way they want it and 
with no joking around. (Ellingson, 2007) 
These excerpts from the poem reflect my ed-
iting of the technician's words and, as such, 
reveal my views of his role in the dialysis 
unit. I constructed the poem to show what 
I appreciated about this man-his earthy 
charm, innate kindness and gentleness, what 
I perceived to be his sincere attempts to 
serve his patients "as a professional." This 
blurring of the boundaries of art and science 
in my writing enriches readers' understand-
ing of the culture of this dialysis unit. 
Personal-Political 
The impetus for arguing that something is 
socially constructed generally arises when a 
phenomenon appears to be natural and in-
evitable (Hacking, 1999). Feminists have 
long argued that the personal is political. Re-
sisting the dichotomy of what should be pri-
vate and what should be public, what is an in-
dividual issue and what is a matter for the 
collective to address, often figures promi-
nently in autoethnography. Autoethnogra-
phers address issues such as child sexual 
abuse (Ronai, 1995), bulimia (Tillman-
Healy, 1996 ), the ravages of irritable bowel 
syndrome (Defenbaugh, in press), and the 
death of a parent (Berger, 1997), bringing 
painful, intimate topics to share with others. 
Many times autoethnography sheds light on 
uncomfortable issues that others wish would 
remain hidden. 
The article I (Carolyn) coauthored with 
my partner Art on our abortion experience 
exemplifies the politics of a personal choice 
and the personal implications of a hotly con-
tested political issue. We wrote: 
No doubt, other persons who have faced abor-
tion have felt the sense of not knowing how to 
feel about or interpret what was happening· to 
them. Others surely have been as bruised as we 
were by the contradictions and ambivalence as-
sociated with the constraints of choice. The ab-
sence of personal narratives to detail the emo-
tional complexities and ambivalence often 
attributed generally to abortion . . . may be 
only the result of people feeling forced to ac-
cept these blows of fate passively or being sub-
jected to taboos against expressing these dis-
turbing feelings openly. Because abortion may 
still be deemed immoral . . . it can become 
nearly impossible to find the words to talk 
about what happened. Making public and vivid 
some of the intricate details of abortion may 
break the barriers that shield public awareness 
and prevent marginalized voices of both 
women and men from being heard. (Ellis & 
Bochner, 1992, p. 99) 
As narrators and performers of this story, 
we gained a perspective on our experience 
and a sense of what it meant that we did not 
have before. The responses of others to our 
performance and text strongly suggest that 
they have been moved to feel and think 
about themselves and others in new and im-
portant ways and to grasp and feel the am-
bivalence, confusion, and pain associated 
with experiences of abortion such as ours. 
The response to the content of this story has 
been both positive and negative, which of 
course met our intent of opening up conver-
sations, though it remains difficult to hear 
some of the condemning remarks. 
Bodily details are certainly another one of 
those personal details that many people . 
would rather not know. I (Laura) include 
many of those in my book on an interdisci-
plinary team, showing my experiences as a 
cancer patient receiving chemotherapy, us-
ing my own suffering to connect me to the 
patients and hospital where I did my re-
search. For example: 
A sharp pain in my lower abdomen startled me 
into wal<efulness and I groaned in recognition. 
I searched the bed for my nurse-call button 
and pushed it. Glancing over at the rapidly 
dripping IV line, I cursed the need for continu-
ous hydration to save my kidneys from the on-
slaught of toxic chemicals that was injected in 
that morning. The bone cancer had left my 
right leg a mess of grafts, stitches, and staples; 
there was no way I could get out of the bed, 
find my crutches, and hobble co the bathroom 
without losing control of my bladder. I was be-
yond exhaustion, and by the time I woke up, 
my bladder was so full it hurt. I'd have to wait 
for my nurse, Chris, to bring a bed pan. . .. 
The hot yellow liquid streamed from my ure-
thra without my consent and the searing 
flames of shame swept over my face. Defeated, 
I let the tears flow with the urine. My pelvic 
muscles relaxed gratefully even as my buttocks 
cringed in retreat from the growing wetness 
that surrounded them. (Ellingson, 2005a, 
p. 87) 
We engage in political work when we openly 
discuss bodily details that society tells us are 
shameful, for we resist the social imperative 
to remain ashamed and hence complicit in 
our powerlessness (Mairs, 1997). 
We embrace troubling the taken-for-
grantedness of the world in order to give 
voice to oppression and move people to ac-
tion or new beliefs and understandings. Yet 
social constructionist projects such as 
autoethnography are not inherently liberat-
ing; material realities do not change simply 
because we reveal their origins and sociopo-
litical complexities; poverty, for example, 
may be shown to be socially constructed as 
being the fault of the poor, but noting unjust 
portrayals does nothing to alleviate the 
crushing oppression of poverty. People 
must be in a position to benefit from the crit-
ical analysis offered by autoethnography 
and other critical methods: "Social construc-
tion theses are liberating chiefly for those 
who are on the way to being liberated . . . 
[those] whose consciousness has already 
been raised" (Hacking, 1999, p. 2). Some 
methods claim liberation as an explicit in-
tent of their project: Practitioners of the 
memory-work method suggest it "is thus ex-
plicitly liberationist in its intent" (Onyx & 
Small, 2001, p. 774). The connection be-
tween intention and action may blur, how-
ever. 
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Ian Hacking (1999) describes six "grades" 
of commitment invoked by different con-
structionist projects. His continuum spans 
from historical constructionism, which ana-
lyzes a phenomenon and posits that it is the 
result of historical events and social pro-
cesses and hence not inevitable, through 
revolutionary constructionism that overtly 
moves beyond writing and "the world of 
ideas" (1999, p . 20) to strive to bring about 
concrete change in the world. Autoethnog-
raphy may reflect any grade of commitment 
to change. Many people's lives have been 
transformed through the process of com-
posing their own stories and of hearing 
those of others; others have been moved to 
action through telling and reading personal 
narratives (Ellis, 2002a). Thus autoethnog-
raphy certainly can be one tool in the social 
change tool box, particularly in its potential 
to spark creative and productive discourse. 
Dialogue moves us toward constructing a 
better world (Gergen, 2006). Many, if not 
most, researchers publish autoethnography 
in academic outlets. Those who seek 
broader audiences and revolutionary social 
change may need to move beyond tradi-
tional academic outlets, such as journals, 
handbooks, and edited collections, to main-
stream outlets, such as trade and popular 
books. 
Could Dichotomies Be Useful?: 
A Concluding Dialogue 
Carolyn: Laura, after cowriting this chap-
ter with you, I was thinking about how di-
chotomies come to seem so natural and 
inevitable; "the reality of everyday life is 
taken for granted as reality" (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 23). We seldom no-
tice how often we invoke these socially 
constructed norms within social science 
simply because they are so foundational to 
our sense of methodological reality. While 
autoethnography troubles tal<en-for-
granted dichotomies, this method can also 
reinscribe them. 
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You operate primarily in the large middle 
ground of the methodological continuum, 
so nondichotomous thinking may be to your 
advantage. For me, working on the humani-
ties end, which traditional ethnographers 
view as more marginal, that might be less 
true. Politically, it might be smart for me to 
encourage people to think in terms of di-
chotomies, at least for a while, because it 
brings focus to what I do. For example, Leon 
Anderson's (2006) article, which views ana-
lytic and evocative autoethnographies as di-
chotomous, actually had the unintended 
consequence of calling the attention of an 
audience of realist ethnographers to the 
kind of autoethnography I do. It provided a 
venue for autoethnographers to speak back 
and "claim" territory, which is important in 
this phase of the interpretive "social move-
ment" going on in ethnographic circles. The 
resistance of Art [Bochner] and me to the re-
alists ' attempt to claim and rename auto-
ethnography put us in the center of the 
debate. We have something other, more 
mainstream ethnographers want. I recog-
nize this as dichotomous thinking, but I still 
think it can be useful as long as we see it for 
what it is-a political strategy rather than 
necessarily useful for knowledge produc-
tion. 
Laura: You're arguing for strategic esse-
ntialism a la Gayatri Spivak (1988), who sug-
gests that we can't fight for women's (or 
other groups') rights ifwe unrelentingly de-
construct the category of women. Thus you 
can't uphold the value of what you do as an 
autoethnographer if you can't define it and 
stake some territory. 
Carolyn: I believe that. But we need not 
have a rigid definition of autoethnography, 
in terms of what's included and what's ex-
cluded from the category (Ellis, 2004). 
Autoethnography is an evolving and fluid 
approach. But to call a work autoethnog-
raphy means it should share at least some, if 
not all, of the most important elements of 
the category-a focus on personal story, evo-
cation, and narrative writing. Anderson's 
conception of autoethnography didn't em-
phasize any of these. I am concerned that 
those in power positions or who fear losing 
relative power may try to appropriate 
autoethnography primarily by watering it 
down so much that it is unrecognizable and 
thus no longer potentially challenging to 
their definitions of what is included in eth-
nography and what is not. 
Laura: I recognize the political necessity 
of challenging existing power structures and 
their policing of disciplinary and method-
ological boundaries (Blair, Brown, & Baxter, 
1994). But relying on existing dichotomies 
to take our stand concedes most of the 
ground to those in power before we even be-
gin. As Audre Lorde (1984) explained, "The 
master's tools will never dismantle the mas-
ter's house" (p. 110). Reifying positivist di-
chotomies in order to challenge the socially 
constructed boundaries of methodological 
legitimacy seems no more effective as a dis-
mantling strategy. The question for me be-
comes, then, how do we help everyone 
to stake tl1eir ground-including my boun-
dary spanning, crystallizing ground-in 
ways that go beyond defining our stories 
dichotomously-as not analysis, our analysis 
as not loose or weak, our personal details as 
not distant, our grounded theory as not 
merely one case? 
This recalls Gergen's ideas about how we 
define things in opposition. Scholars under-
stand the positivist rules of social science 
primarily through what they exclude~ 
subjectivity, intimacy, stories, and so on-
and autoethnographers have challenged 
these socially constructed standards by fla-
grantly violating them (Gergen, 1999). I can 
see why that is helpful. When Leon uses the 
analytic versus evocative dichotomy, he en-
ables you to speak up for your position~ 
However, this also recollects what I said 
about how dichotomies present as opposites 
what are actually interdependent for mean" 
ing. Thus we cannot have autoethnography 
if there isn't realist ethnography for con~ 
trast. 
Carolyn: Though the realists would like to 
think they can have realist ethnography with0 . 
out autoethnography because they think 
realist ethnography is ethnography and 
autoethnography, if it should exist at all, 
would be subsumed under their label. That's 
what can happen if we don't honor dichoto-
mies, I'm afraid. We all become one cate-
gory, like women all used to be lumped 
under mankind, and masculine pronouns 
stood for all of us. 
I think nuanced disagreement is impor-
tant. Don't new ways of thinking come out of 
this kind of dialogue? And aren't things 
sometimes improved with new paradigms 
that address gaps and holes that older para-
digms ignore or miss? Conflict can be useful; 
it can point the way for change. Sometimes 
it's productive to get our dander up, feel a 
little angry, and be determined to show the 
value of our position. You might argue that 
adrenaline could limit our perspective, but I 
also think feeling revved up about some-
thing can help us do deeper work. I feel 
that's been the case for me. 
Besides, too much lukewarm agreement, 
which I predict would happen if we gave up 
entirely on dichotomies, would interfere 
with the word games that academics like to 
play. Sometimes when I argue with realists 
over meanings, I wonder if that's all we're 
doing- acting as wordsmiths. I don't know 
how important these games are in the whole 
scheme of things. Sometimes I think this 
kind of debate isn't really important at all, 
except to protect the few measly resources 
represented in the struggle. I doubt word 
mining and position defending contribute 
to making the world a better place. Maybe 
these disagreements simply entertain us un-
til rigor morris sets in. 
Laura: I'm not sure how entertaining they 
are. In the beginning of autoethnography, it 
made sense to harness that adrenaline to re-
inforce the differences- and hence value-
inherent in our position. Someone else had 
all the methodological power, and so we be-
gan by getting angry and critiquing them to 
stake our ground. Feminists started with 
similar opposition-race scholars, queer the-
orists, and now autoethnographers have, 
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too. But haven't we already made the case 
that autoethnography is useful, meaningful, 
and legitimate? What comes after anger and 
defensiveness? Shouldn't we explore inter-
dependency instead of opposition? 
Carolyn: That sounds good in theory, but 
in practice it's difficult because the goals of 
autoethnographers and realists are differ-
ent. To be interdependent we have to agree 
on goals for our research, or at least agree 
that it is legitimate and worthwhile to have 
different goals. Autoethnog:raphers honor 
meaning, intelligibility, and interpretation 
as their goals, whereas the realists look more 
to facts and representation. Given these dif-
ferences, it's hard to agree on how to go 
about achieving our purposes (Bochner, 
1985). Then there's also power politics. 
This conversation makes me laugh, be-
cause I'm usually the "let's get along" and 
"here are the ways in which we overlap 
rather than divide" person, and you're more 
into power politics. Now we've switched 
sides. I've become more watchful. I don't 
want to give in to people who then, instead 
of meeting me halfway, view my giving in as 
a weakness and an opportunity to control 
my voice with theirs. 
I try not to think in terms of power poli-
tics, but I also know that if I ignore that real-
ity, I stand to lose a lot of ground. Granted, 
my work has flourished from my concentrat-
ing on what I do well, rather than defending 
it and debating with people who criticize 
what I do. But sometimes that debate be-
comes important, because many graduate 
students and young professors need senior 
scholars to take a position and speak back, to 
help them in their quest for their autoethno-
graphic projects to be taken seriously. So 
sometimes I think we need to come on 
strong and show that we're not going to roll 
over and play dead. We're resisting en-
croachment and defending what we care 
about. But I'm aware that this position is in-
consistent with what I've argued in the past 
and has its consequences, such as conflict 
with people who have more similarities with 
me than differences. 
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Laura: Exactly. Perhaps the first step to-
ward mutual accommodation with produc-
tive, collaborative debate is to find a lan-
guage of interdependency to replace or at 
least augment the language of war and 
opposition. You present something along 
this line in your response to Bill Tierney, 
who critiqued autoethnography (Ellis, 
2002a). 
Carolyn: Yes-I suggested that we respond 
to critique with "yes, and ... " rather than 
"yes, but .... " 
Laura: Yes, and a language of interdepen-
dency would explain how autocthnography 
needs realist ethnography, how stories call 
out for theory, how theories require specific 
cases. We need to surrender the battle 
metaphors about "laying claim," "seizing 
ground," "defending our turf," and "giving 
power" to the other side and imagine new 
ways of relating-sharing the loaf, swimming 
alongside each other, planting a bountiful 
garden with many varieties of fruits, vegeta-
bles, and flowers, and so on. The use of war-
like metaphors fosters an equation of 
argument with violence (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980). Because "through language an entire 
world can be actualized" (Berger & Luck-
mann, 1966, p. 39), we should consider care-
fully the implications of our choice to actual-
ize a pervasively violent world. I don't want 
to suggest that we pretend there is no con-
flict but that we introduce language into our 
debates that offers some hope of accommo-
dation rather than merely reinvoking the 
same old power struggle over who's right 
and who's wrong. 
Carolyn: Part of a solution is to see one-
self as interdependent with members of a 
relevant community, such as the community 
of ethnographers. For example, in the re-
sponse to Anderson (Ellis & Bochner, 2006), 
I pointed out commonalities among all ofus 
who do ethnography, no matter how we la-
bel ourselves. I worry sometimes that we 
aren't accomplishing as much as we could if 
all ethnographers joined together and 
thought of themselves as a community with 
multiple shared goals and mutual standards. 
That would make us a stronger coalition 
against the positivists, with whom we have 
more differences than we do with each 
other. Of course, that just changes the 
oppositional group. 
Laura: I'd like to know if it is possible to 
stand next to the positivists rather than 
against them. 
Carolyn: I'm not sure we have enough in 
common witl1 them, or they with us, to make 
standing next to each other a worthwhile 
goal. 
Laura: Aren't you and I the perfect exam-
ple? Within the context of our relationship,• 
we care deeply about each other. We stand 
together. Yet we do different work, and we 
disagree, if not on what is legitimate, then 
on priorities, on what is most valuable and 
worthy of spending our time on. This real-
ization pained me at first, because I not only 
cared about you but also wanted you to be 
proud ofme. Perhaps it disappointed you as 
well. But we moved past that and con-
structed a way of relating that celebrates our 
commonalities and respects our differences.· 
As in our relationship, methodologists could 
address differences of opinion by making 
room for commonalities and differences ( oh 
no-is that dichotomy[?). I don't want to 
sound hopelessly optimistic, and I know ma" 
terial outcomes are at stal<.e (like tenure) . 
Carolyn: You and I get along because we 
love and respect each other but also because 
we see ourselves as having more commonali-
ties than differences in the areas that matter. 
We are both academics, ethnographers, 
social scientists, communication scholars, 
women, responsible people, and so on. Be-
sides, you're not a positivist! Just kidding. 
Our differences really don' t amount to 
much. What's more interesting to me is 
when the differences do matter. If you wrote 
a piece that attacked autoethnography, then 
our differences would be more salient. The 
same might be true if I attacked the work 
you do, which is some of what you felt in the 
initial stages of your dissertation. It's not as 
though our work and relationships can't sur-
vive some criticism and disagreement; they 
can. And sometimes they're enhanced as a 
result, as I said before. But if all we hear is 
critique, especially disrespectful critique ... 
well, it has an effect. At some point, it would 
be nice to show some appreciation for the 
work of others. Maybe academics just don't 
show enough respect for what those doing 
different work are achieving. We're 
schooled in the "shootout at the OK Corral" 
mode. That's hard to get rid of-try as we 
might-for us as well as "them." 
Laura: I agree that more traditional re-
searchers seldom express respect for 
autoethnographers, at least not overtly, and 
many offer criticism. And I am continually 
amazed by how much casual bashing of oth-
ers' work I hear in the hallways at confer-
ences (let alone in sessions), by people 
ranging all across the methodological con-
tinuum. Perhaps I find this particularly pain-
ful because my work spans a larger than av-
erage chunk of the continuum, leaving me 
vulnerable to critique from a great number 
of positions. I am left to ponder, could we 
move past tolerance to appreciation of dif-
ferences? And can we do that without rein-
forcing dichotomies? Maybe not. Maybe I'm 
too idealistic, and dichotomies really are 
needed for clarification and debate. 
Carolyn: No, don't give up that easily. We 
need the large, messy middle ground to hold 
us all together, and right now I feel pretty 
messy. This conversation makes me aware 
that I can and often do construct my posi-
tion about dichotomies from both sides . .. I 
mean, at numerous points along the contin-
uum. While I see this kind of questioning 
and messiness as functional for helping me 
think through what's going on, it's not a 
strength that is appreciated often in the 
academy. The academy rewards us for 
"taking and defending a position." Maybe 
that's what leads to dichotomies-the push 
to take a position, make a case, defend our 
work. 
Laura: As you know, I'm happiest in the 
messy middle ground. Do you think we can 
ever find a peaceful academic corral to re-
place the oppositional "shootout" one? 
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Carolyn: I surely hope so. But wait a sec-
ond ... . 
Laura and Carolyn (Together): Oh, no, 
isn't that another dichotomy? 
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